diff --git a/current/CHECKPOINT-HTTPZ.md b/current/CHECKPOINT-HTTPZ.md
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+# CHECKPOINT-HTTPZ — Stream HTTPZ (production HTTP-server readiness)
+
+Tracker for the HTTP-server production-readiness stream. Plan:
+[PLAN-HTTPZ.md](PLAN-HTTPZ.md). Update after every step.
+
+## Last completed step
+**Stream established (planning only).** Audited the existing HTTP/socket/thread/event
+stack against the user's production-readiness checklist and wrote
+[PLAN-HTTPZ.md](PLAN-HTTPZ.md) + this checkpoint. **No code changed.** Prior HTTP work
+(socket `S2`, thread `S6`, http `S7a`, pool `S7b`) shipped without a tracked plan; this
+brings the stream under checkpoint discipline.
+
+## Current state
+- **Done & Linux-validated (do NOT rebuild):** `event.sx` (epoll+kqueue, 6/6 green on real
+  aarch64 Linux in Apple `container`), `net/epoll.sx`, `net/kqueue.sx`, `sched.sx` M:1
+  runtime, `json.sx`.
+- **BROKEN on Linux (Phase C3 keystone):**
+  - `socket.sx` — Darwin-only `SockAddr` (`sin_len`), `O_NONBLOCK=4`, macOS errno values,
+    `__error` binding. Corrupts addresses + breaks WouldBlock detection on Linux.
+  - `thread.sx` — `MutexBuf=64B` (Darwin) vs glibc 40B → 24-byte heap overflow on
+    `pthread_mutex_init`. Pool unsafe on Linux.
+- **Works, unhardened — `http.sx`:** single-worker loop + inline/pool handlers, keep-alive,
+  delivery timeouts, conn/request caps, 400/413/431/503. Gaps: parser limits, `Server.close()`
+  leaks (`conns`/`PoolState`/`done`), no graceful stop, no handler-exec timeout, zero
+  observability, no streaming.
+- **Absent entirely:** CI (no Linux CI), fuzz, sanitizers/leak-check (`tests/stress-http.sh`
+  broken — references deleted `32-http-server.sx`), releases/tags, SECURITY.md, deploy docs,
+  routing/form helpers. **TLS:** none yet — to be added natively via mbedTLS FFI (Phase T).
+
+Full grounded audit (file:line) lives in PLAN-HTTPZ.md "Audit of record".
+
+## Next step
+**Phase C3a — `socket.sx` per-OS selection.** Branch `SockAddr`, `O_NONBLOCK`, errno
+constants, and `errno_slot` on `OS`/`ARCH` (mirror the `inline if OS ==` pattern in
+`event.sx`/`sched.sx`). Lock a Linux-vs-Darwin layout/const assertion red (cadence rule),
+then flip green; validate under the Apple `container` Linux VM. No silent fallback defaults.
+> **NOT STARTED** — user requested plan-only this session. Execution begins next session.
+
+## Known issues / capability gaps
+- `socket.sx` / `thread.sx` Linux-broken (above) — blocks all Linux P0 acceptance.
+- No CI of any kind in the repo → "tested on Linux" cannot be claimed until C4.
+- Corpus runner (10s/example timeout, no net sandbox) cannot host stress/fuzz/load — those
+  go in separate CI-wired scripts (PLAN decision).
+- `http.sx` `Server.close()` leaks on shutdown (H2).
+- No handler-execution timeout in either handler mode (H5).
+
+## Decisions (HTTPZ specifics — full list in PLAN-HTTPZ.md)
+- Native TLS via an mbedTLS FFI binding (Phase T) — supersedes the original proxy-only
+  posture; proxy deployment stays supported/documented. No pure-sx TLS stack.
+- `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` rejected (501) in H1, implemented in S1/S2.
+- Stress/fuzz/load harnesses live outside the corpus, wired into CI.
+- C3 branching bails loudly on unhandled OS/arch arms — no Darwin-default fallback.
+
+## Log
+- **2026-06-26** — Stream established. Parallel audit of `http.sx`, `socket.sx`,
+  `thread.sx`, `event.sx`, `net/epoll.sx`, `net/kqueue.sx`, `sched.sx`, the test/CI/bench
+  infra, and the docs/release/security posture against the production-readiness checklist.
+  Wrote PLAN-HTTPZ.md (phases C/H/S/D mapping checklist P0/P1/P2) + this checkpoint.
+  No code changes. Next: Phase C3a.
+- **2026-06-26** — Added **Phase T (native TLS via mbedTLS FFI)** to PLAN-HTTPZ.md, slotted
+  after Phase H; flipped the proxy-only decision to native-TLS-plus-proxy; updated D1.
+  Backend chosen: mbedTLS (static-link-friendly, clean non-blocking API). Still plan-only.
diff --git a/current/PLAN-HTTPZ.md b/current/PLAN-HTTPZ.md
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+# PLAN-HTTPZ — Stream HTTPZ (production HTTP-server readiness)
+
+> **STATUS: 🟡 PLANNED — not started.** This stream is being (re)established as a
+> *tracked* stream. The HTTP/socket/thread work to date shipped ad-hoc under phase
+> tags in source comments (`S2` socket nonblocking, `S6` pthreads, `S7a` http server,
+> `S7b` thread-pool handlers, `C3` per-OS selection) but **never had a PLAN/CHECKPOINT
+> file** — the comments in [socket.sx:3](../library/modules/std/socket.sx#L3) /
+> [thread.sx:23](../library/modules/std/thread.sx#L23) reference a "PLAN-HTTPZ" that did
+> not exist until now. Progress tracked in [CHECKPOINT-HTTPZ.md](CHECKPOINT-HTTPZ.md).
+
+**Goal:** the low-level guarantees needed to run a long-lived HTTP service on Linux in
+production — *not* a web framework. Survive malformed clients, slow clients, overload,
+restarts, memory pressure, and a normal Linux deployment without every app author
+rediscovering the same failure modes. Driven by the user's production-readiness checklist
+(P0 blockers, P1 hardening, P2 ergonomics), mapped below to concrete sx work.
+
+**Cadence (IMPASSIBLE):** no commit both adds a test AND makes it pass (lock-to-bail, then
+flip to green); `zig build && zig build test` green after every step; never regen snapshots
+while red; scope regens with `-Dname=examples/<cat>/<file>.sx -Dupdate-goldens` + review the
+diff. HTTP corpus lives in `examples/http/` (`16xx`/`http` category) + `examples/event/`.
+Stress/fuzz/load harnesses live OUTSIDE the corpus (the corpus runner has a 10s/example
+timeout and no network sandbox — see [corpus_run.test.zig](../src/corpus_run.test.zig)).
+
+---
+
+## Audit of record (grounded against the tree, 2026-06-26)
+
+What already exists, so the next session does not redo discovery. **Two layers of P0 #1
+are already done to a high standard; one piece is a literal blocker.**
+
+### ✅ Solid / Linux-validated — do NOT rebuild
+- **[event.sx](../library/modules/std/event.sx)** — `Loop` fully branches `OS == .linux`
+  (epoll, lines ~85–251) vs kqueue (~251–323). Ran **6/6 green on real aarch64 Linux** in
+  an Apple `container` VM (kernel 6.18); ABI corpus-locked by `examples/event/1633`.
+- **[net/epoll.sx](../library/modules/std/net/epoll.sx)** — arch-aware `EpollEvent` layout
+  (12B packed x86_64 / 16B aligned aarch64 via the u32-split trick), correct flags, EINTR
+  retry, `__errno_location`.
+- **[net/kqueue.sx](../library/modules/std/net/kqueue.sx)** — macOS-only, correct.
+- **[sched.sx](../library/modules/std/sched.sx)** — M:1 fiber runtime; epoll/kqueue
+  fd-readiness fully branched incl. `EPOLL_CTL_DEL` after `EPOLLONESHOT`. Linux-tested.
+- **[json.sx](../library/modules/std/json.sx)** — streaming writer, zero-copy views,
+  explicit allocators, stable key order. (Integers only — no floats.)
+
+### ❌ BROKEN on Linux — the keystone blocker (Phase C3)
+- **[socket.sx](../library/modules/std/socket.sx)** — Darwin-only, no `OS` branching:
+  - `SockAddr` ([:32](../library/modules/std/socket.sx#L32)) carries Darwin's `sin_len:u8`
+    at offset 0; Linux `sockaddr_in` has no such field → family/port written to wrong
+    offsets, addresses corrupted.
+  - `O_NONBLOCK = 4` — Linux is `2048`; `set_nonblocking` sets the wrong bit.
+  - errno constants are macOS values (`EAGAIN=35`→Linux 11, `EINPROGRESS=36`→115,
+    `ECONNRESET=54`→104, …) → WouldBlock/reset detection silently breaks.
+  - `errno_slot` binds `__error` ([:52](../library/modules/std/socket.sx#L52)) — Linux is
+    `__errno_location`.
+- **[thread.sx](../library/modules/std/thread.sx)** — Darwin pthread struct sizes:
+  - `MutexBuf = 64B` ([:44](../library/modules/std/thread.sx#L44)) is Darwin's
+    `pthread_mutex_t`; glibc is **40B** → `pthread_mutex_init` overflows the buffer by
+    24B. **Heap corruption on first mutex init under the thread pool.** (`CondBuf = 48B`
+    happens to match glibc — fragile coincidence.)
+
+### ⚠️ Works, unhardened — [http.sx](../library/modules/std/http.sx)
+Single-worker event loop; inline (`thread_pool_count = 0`) + pooled handlers; keep-alive
++ pipelining; delivery timeouts (`timeout_request_ms`/`timeout_keepalive_ms`); conn cap
+(`max_conn`) + per-conn request cap (`request_count`); emits 400/413/431/503. Connection
+state machine: `CONN_FREE/READING/WRITING/KEEPALIVE/HANDLING` with `gen` counter.
+**Gaps (this stream's HTTP work):**
+- **Parser:** `Content-Length` only (no `Transfer-Encoding`); no per-header-line size
+  limit; no header-count limit; no request-line/version syntax validation; no duplicate
+  `Content-Length` rejection; no `Content-Length` overflow guard.
+- **Memory:** `Server.close()` ([:317](../library/modules/std/http.sx#L317)) frees neither
+  the `conns` array, the `PoolState` struct, nor `ps.done` → shutdown leaks.
+- **Shutdown:** `run()` is an infinite loop; no `Server.stop()`; `close()` is abrupt (no
+  drain).
+- **Timeouts:** delivery-only. **No handler-execution timeout** — a hung handler blocks
+  the loop (inline) or pins a pool worker forever; no cancellation.
+- **Observability:** **none.** All accept/read/write/loop faults close the connection
+  silently — no log hook, no counters/metrics.
+- **Response:** whole response built in one allocation; no streaming, no body-size
+  backpressure; alloc-failure path unhandled.
+
+### ❌ Absent entirely
+- **CI:** no `.github/workflows`, no Linux CI. Local `zig build test` on macOS only.
+- **Fuzz / sanitizers / leak-check:** none. [tests/stress-http.sh](../tests/stress-http.sh)
+  is broken (references deleted `examples/32-http-server.sx`).
+- **Releases:** no git tags, no CHANGELOG, no stability tiers.
+- **Security:** no SECURITY.md, no disclosure process, no posture statement.
+- **Deploy docs:** cross-compile/static-link documented in [readme.md](../readme.md); no
+  systemd/Docker/reverse-proxy/health-check/graceful-shutdown examples.
+- **TLS:** none yet — to be added natively via an mbedTLS FFI binding (Phase T). Proxy
+  deployment stays documented as an option (D1).
+- **Routing / query / form helpers:** manual `if req.path == …` dispatch only.
+
+---
+
+## Phases (dependency-ordered; checklist item in parens)
+
+C3 is the keystone — until socket.sx + thread.sx are correct on Linux, **nothing in P0 is
+honestly testable on Linux**, so Phase C precedes all else regardless of how the rest is
+sliced.
+
+### Phase C — Linux foundation (P0 #1) — unblocks everything
+- **C3a — `socket.sx` per-OS.** Branch `SockAddr` (drop `sin_len` on Linux), `O_NONBLOCK`,
+  the errno constants, and `errno_slot` (`__error` vs `__errno_location`) on `OS`/`ARCH`,
+  mirroring the `inline if OS ==` pattern already proven in `event.sx`/`sched.sx`. No
+  silent fallback defaults (CLAUDE.md rule). Lock a Linux-vs-Darwin layout/const test red,
+  then green.
+- **C3b — `thread.sx` per-OS.** Correct `MutexBuf`/`CondBuf` sizes per glibc (40/48) vs
+  Darwin (64/48), branched. Memory-safety fix, not cosmetics. Validate under the Apple
+  `container` Linux VM that the pool no longer corrupts the heap.
+- **C4 — Linux CI.** A workflow building + running `zig build test` (incl. the HTTP corpus)
+  on Linux. The Apple-`container` path is proven for local validation; CI needs a real
+  Linux runner (GH Actions `ubuntu` and/or self-hosted aarch64). First CI of any kind for
+  the repo.
+- **C5 — Linux socket I/O corpus.** Examples covering accept/read/write/close/error on
+  Linux (today only the macOS-friendly `1633` covers the happy path). Threaded-handler
+  example included.
+- *Acceptance:* basic server compiles + runs on Linux; HTTP suite passes on Linux; accept/
+  read/write/close/error paths covered; threaded mode correct.
+
+### Phase H — HTTP hardening (P0 #2–6)
+- **H1 — Parser hardening (#2).** Max header-line size, max header count, strict
+  request-line + version validation, CRLF strictness, `Content-Length` overflow guard +
+  duplicate/conflicting rejection, **`Transfer-Encoding: chunked` → 501** (full impl in
+  S1), slowloris coverage (delivery-timeout already mitigates). Outcomes: 400 / 413 / 431 /
+  501 / safe-close. Unit + fuzz-seed corpus.
+- **H2 — Memory lifecycle (#3).** Fix `Server.close()` to free `conns`, `PoolState`, and
+  `ps.done`. Document allocator ownership (long-lived containers must capture their owner —
+  CLAUDE.md rule; the read buffers are intentionally per-conn). Leak gate: start/stop loop
+  with GPA counters asserting zero + repaired stress script for RSS-over-churn.
+- **H3 — Graceful shutdown (#4).** `Server.stop()` — stop accepting, drain in-flight within
+  a timeout, close idle keep-alives, return from `run()` cleanly. Tests: start/stop/restart
+  in one process; no FD leak; no mem leak.
+- **H4 — Explicit errors + observability hooks (#5, #9).** Route accept/read/write/loop
+  faults through a pluggable log/error hook instead of silent close; add counters (active /
+  accepted / closed conns, requests served, parser errors, timeouts, rejected, 4xx/5xx,
+  pool queue depth, optional request duration). Hook-based — no forced logging format.
+  (#5 and #9 interlock; land together.)
+- **H5 — Handler timeout + cancellation (#6).** Per-request deadline enforced in BOTH
+  inline and pool modes; bound time in `CONN_HANDLING`; timed-out → 504 or safe close. A
+  never-returning handler must not permanently consume capacity.
+
+### Phase T — Native TLS via mbedTLS (#15) — revises the proxy-only posture
+Native in-process HTTPS by binding a vetted C library (mbedTLS) over FFI — **not** a
+pure-sx TLS stack (out of scope: security-critical, multi-year). Slotted after H because
+TLS folds into the same connection state machine + `read_more`/`write_more` paths, which
+must be stable first. Backend: **mbedTLS** (small pure-C, clean `WANT_READ`/`WANT_WRITE`
+non-blocking API, static-links cleanly into `--self-contained` musl ELF; Apache-2.0).
+- **T1 — mbedTLS FFI binding.** New `library/modules/ffi/mbedtls.sx` (or `std/tls.sx`):
+  `extern "c"` decls for `mbedtls_ssl_{init,setup,handshake,read,write,close_notify}`,
+  `mbedtls_ssl_config`, `mbedtls_x509_crt`, `mbedtls_pk_context`, `mbedtls_ctr_drbg` +
+  `mbedtls_entropy`, `mbedtls_ssl_set_bio`, and the `WANT_READ`/`WANT_WRITE` error
+  constants. Loud failure on any setup error (no silent default — CLAUDE.md rule).
+- **T2 — Transport abstraction in `http.sx`.** Introduce a transport seam so `read_more`/
+  `write_more` go through plaintext (today's `socket.*_nb`) OR TLS, instead of calling the
+  socket directly. mbedTLS BIO callbacks bridge to the non-blocking fd: map socket
+  `WouldBlock` → `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE`.
+- **T3 — Handshake state + event-loop integration.** New `CONN_TLS_HANDSHAKE` state before
+  `CONN_READING`; drive `mbedtls_ssl_handshake` incrementally, mapping `WANT_READ` →
+  `loop.add_read`, `WANT_WRITE` → `loop.add_write`; handshake deadline (reuse
+  `timeout_request_ms`); graceful `close_notify` on shutdown (ties into H3).
+- **T4 — TLS config surface.** `Config` gains `tls_enabled`, cert/key/chain paths, min
+  version (default TLS 1.2+, prefer 1.3), optional ALPN, SNI (single default cert first;
+  multi-cert later). Cert/key load failure is a loud `HttpErr`, never a silent fallthrough.
+- **T5 — Tests + static-link + Linux validation.** TLS corpus example: in-process mbedTLS
+  *client* handshakes against the server over loopback with a self-signed cert fixture
+  (under `examples/http/16xx-…/`); cover bad-cert, handshake-failure, and mid-handshake
+  client-abort paths. Verify a `--self-contained` static build links mbedTLS; run on macOS
+  + aarch64 Linux (Apple `container`). Document the per-target mbedTLS static-archive
+  requirement for self-contained builds (vendor vs system).
+
+### Phase S — Streaming, stress, stability (P1)
+- **S1 — Streaming responses + chunked out (#10).** Explicit `Content-Length`; stream large
+  bodies without buffering the whole response; write-backpressure-aware send; header-set /
+  status / content-type helpers. (Builds on H1's chunked scaffolding.)
+- **S2 — Request-body streaming (#11).** Incremental body reader, configurable max, early
+  reject, mid-body-disconnect handling, backpressure-aware reads. Enables real inbound
+  chunked bodies.
+- **S3 — Fuzz harness (#7).** libFuzzer/AFL targets: request-line, header, `Content-Length`,
+  keep-alive + pipeline state machine, partial reads, malformed bodies, random close
+  timing. Runs manually + in CI. Crash/panic/hang = bug.
+- **S4 — Load/stress suite (#8).** Repair + expand the stress scripts: many short-lived,
+  many keep-alive, slow clients, large bodies at the limit, pool saturation, FD exhaustion
+  → 503/backpressure (not crash), RSS-over-time. Document expected overload behavior.
+- **S5 — Concurrency model docs (#12).** Write up the allocator/thread-safety rules already
+  asserted in [thread.sx:11](../library/modules/std/thread.sx#L11) + the http.sx header:
+  handler execution model, per-request lifetime, what may be retained after a handler
+  returns, misuse cases.
+- **S6 — API stability + security posture (#13, #14).** Tag a milestone; define the stable
+  std subset (`http`/`socket`/`event`/`thread`/`mem`); SECURITY.md + disclosure process +
+  the "reverse-proxy-only, not for direct internet exposure" posture statement + known
+  limitations.
+
+### Phase D — Deploy & ergonomics (P2)
+- **D1 — Reverse-proxy + deployment docs (#15, #20).** With native TLS shipping in Phase T,
+  proxy deployment is now *an option, not the only option* — document both. Cover proxy TLS
+  termination, forwarded headers, client-IP, size limits, timeouts, keep-alive, recommended
+  proxy settings; AND native-TLS direct-exposure guidance (cert rotation, cipher/version
+  policy). Plus systemd unit, Docker, health-check endpoint, graceful-shutdown, logging
+  examples; release-binary build + static/dynamic linking notes (incl. the mbedTLS
+  static-archive note from T5; cross-compile already in readme.md).
+- **D2 — Routing + query/form helpers (#16, #17).** Thin layer over manual dispatch: method
+  + path routing, path params, query parsing, 404/405, per-route limits/timeouts; form
+  (urlencoded/multipart) + JSON request/response helpers over the existing json.sx.
+- **D3 — Honest benchmarks (#18).** Revive [bench/run.sh](../bench/run.sh): plain-text,
+  JSON, keep-alive, concurrency, pool, slow-client vs a baseline server; record hardware/
+  OS/flags/command; measure latency, throughput, memory, error rate.
+- **D4 — Compiler-confidence framing (#19).** Largely already true (corpus + `issues/`
+  regressions, subprocess-isolated runner). Add the "supported vs experimental" labelling
+  for language + std features; ensure production-critical features have corpus coverage.
+
+---
+
+## Decisions Log (HTTPZ specifics)
+- **Native TLS via an mbedTLS FFI binding (Phase T)** — supersedes the original
+  reverse-proxy-only posture (2026-06-26). The server gains in-process HTTPS; reverse-proxy
+  deployment stays supported and documented (D1) as an option. **No pure-sx TLS stack** —
+  TLS is security-critical and is delegated to the vetted C library. mbedTLS chosen over
+  OpenSSL/LibreSSL for its small pure-C footprint, clean non-blocking `WANT_READ`/
+  `WANT_WRITE` API, and clean static-linking into `--self-contained` musl builds
+  (Apache-2.0).
+- **`Transfer-Encoding: chunked`: reject (501) in H1, implement in S1/S2.** Pragmatic P0
+  minimum is explicit rejection; full chunked support is gated on the streaming work.
+- **Stress/fuzz/load live outside the corpus.** The corpus runner has a 10s/example
+  timeout and no network sandbox; long-running adversarial harnesses are separate scripts
+  wired into CI, not `examples/`.
+- **No silent fallback defaults in any C3 branching** (CLAUDE.md REJECTED PATTERNS): a
+  failed/unhandled OS or arch arm bails loudly, never picks a "reasonable-looking" Darwin
+  default.